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SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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 The key question in this case is not an easy one.  
We must determine when dismissal for failure to comply 
with Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
is appropriate.  In so doing, we also attempt to provide 
more structure to a narrow area of law that has been 
subject to confusion within this Circuit.  The specific 
question we are confronted with is whether a district 
court’s decision to dismiss a party’s post-trial motion 
because that party chose not to attempt to recreate the 
trial record, despite being ordered to do so, was an abuse 
of discretion.  We hold that it was not.  We also hold that 
Appellant’s other claims of error lack merit.  We will 
therefore affirm. 
I. 
 Plaintiff Reginald Roberts, a former employee of 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, brought suit against 
Montgomery County and a number of its employees1 
alleging that he “suffered continual retaliation, 
discrimination and humiliation” at work in violation of 
                                                 
1 In addition to the County, Defendants include Risa 
Vetri Ferman; James Matthews; Joseph M. Hoeffel, III; 
Bruce L. Castor, Jr.; Oscar P. Vance, Jr.; Samuel Gallen; 
Stephen Forzato; Edmund Justice; Carolyn T. Carluccio; 
Mark Bernstiel; and Toni Luter (collectively, 
“Defendants”). 
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Title VII and his constitutional rights.  Pl.’s Am. Compl. 
3, ECF No. 4.  The complaint, as amended in January 
2010, contains five counts, two of which, counts II and 
III, allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation 
against Roberts for his allegedly protected speech.  
Specifically, in count II, Roberts alleges that he was 
retaliated against by several County employees for 
seeking heart and lung benefits, filing employment 
discrimination charges, and testifying at a Fact Finding 
Conference before the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission.  Count III contains the same allegations but 
seeks to hold the County liable directly, based on Monell 
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York.  
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (“Local governing bodies, 
therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, 
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, 
regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body’s officers.” (footnote 
omitted)).  The case was originally assigned to Judge 
Savage, who granted in part and denied in part 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 23, 2010.  On 
March 31, 2010, the parties then agreed to have the 
matter referred in its entirety to a magistrate judge.   
 After briefing and oral argument, the magistrate 
judge granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment, further limiting the 
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claims that would proceed to trial.  Important for 
purposes of this appeal, the magistrate judge denied in 
part and granted in part summary judgment on counts II 
and III of the amended complaint.  However, after 
alleging bias on the part of the magistrate judge, Roberts, 
on October 6, 2011, moved to revoke his consent to 
adjudication by a magistrate.  Roberts’ petition to revoke 
consent was granted on January 4, 2012, and his motion 
for recusal based on alleged judicial bias was thus denied 
as moot.  This case was then reassigned to Judge Savage, 
who scheduled an initial pre-trial conference and 
prepared the case for trial. 
 On February 21, 2012, Judge Savage held a final 
pre-trial conference at which he expressed concern about 
whether Roberts would be able to make out a proper 
Monell claim against the County based on the facts as 
then clearly presented.  He also questioned whether the 
County could legally be held liable under Monell in light 
of a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision 
regarding the division of authority between the County 
and the Commonwealth.  With that in mind, Judge 
Savage asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing 
on the effect of the recent change in Pennsylvania law.  
As Roberts’ attorney noted, “[i]f the law is changed, that 
would be a reason for reconsideration.”  Tr. of Final 
Pretrial Conference at 236, Roberts v. Ferman, No. 09-
4895 (February 21, 2012). 
 At the final pre-trial hearing held the morning 
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before voir dire, Judge Savage re-raised this issue and 
entertained the parties’ arguments.  Ultimately, after 
considering the supplemental briefing, both sides’ oral 
arguments, and the magistrate judge’s opinion, Judge 
Savage granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants on both counts II and III, reversing the earlier 
denial by the magistrate judge.  The case proceeded to 
trial on the remaining claims.  Six days later, the jury 
rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants on all counts.   
 Roberts then filed a timely motion for a new trial 
or in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.  In this motion, Roberts made several general 
allegations of error, focusing primarily on the conduct of 
the trial judge.  For example, Roberts claimed that “[t]he 
Judge was not clear, consistent and/or fair when making 
rulings.  The Judge’s conduct towards the Plaintiff 
showed contempt for the Plaintiff and disfavor toward 
Plaintiff’s counsel.”  Pl.’s Post Trial Mot. for New Trial 
3, ECF No. 228.  In addition, because Roberts again 
raised allegations of bias—this time by Judge Savage—
the case was reassigned to Judge Quiñones.  It was then 
also discovered that four of the six days of the trial 
transcript had unfortunately been lost.2 
                                                 
2 Roberts on appeal notes that he was told by the Clerk’s 
Office that the court reporter had become ill and this 
caused what was at first believed to be just a delay in 
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 Upon learning that the trial record was incomplete, 
Judge Quiñones granted Roberts’ motion for 
extraordinary relief and ordered the court reporting 
company to produce the transcript for this case.  Even 
this order, however, ultimately failed to secure the 
transcripts.  Several months later, and after several more 
unsuccessful attempts to obtain the trial transcripts, Judge 
Quiñones denied Roberts’ second, nearly identical, 
motion for extraordinary relief that again sought to force 
the court reporting company to turn over the transcript.  
In a footnote, Judge Quiñones concluded that granting 
another such motion would be futile, as the court had 
made numerous failed attempts to obtain the complete 
trial transcript. 
 Judge Quiñones instead ordered the parties to 
recreate the record in compliance with Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 10(c) so that she could rule on 
Roberts’ post-trial motion.  Roberts, however, chose not 
to comply with this order, arguing that any attempt to do 
so would be useless, as the parties would not be able to 
agree on the contents of a 10(c) statement.  Thus, over 
nine months after ordering the parties to comply with 
Rule 10(c), Judge Quiñones was still without a record 
with which she could assess the merits of Roberts’ post-
trial motion.  Concluding, therefore, that Roberts’ failure 
                                                                                                             
obtaining the transcripts.  Why the transcripts were never 
ultimately obtained remains unclear. 
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to comply with Rule 10(c) constituted a failure to 
prosecute, Judge Quiñones dismissed his motion.  
Roberts appealed. 3 
II. 
 Before addressing the substance of Roberts’ 
arguments, we must address an argument raised by 
Defendants.  They note that Roberts failed to include 
even the available portions of the trial and pre-trial 
transcripts in the record on appeal.  This, Defendants 
argue, demonstrates a “remarkable lack of diligence” by 
Roberts and suggests that under Lehman Brothers 
                                                 
3 We have jurisdiction here under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as 
denial of Roberts’ post-judgment motion “ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment.”  Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).  It is thus immediately 
appealable.  In addition, because interlocutory orders 
such as partial grants of summary judgment merge with 
the final judgment, they can be challenged on appeal.  
Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 
244 (3d Cir. 2013).  Finally, “[w]e review dismissal of a 
post-trial motion as a sanction for abuse of discretion,”  
Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 
2013), and give plenary review to grants of summary 
judgment,  Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 
F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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Holdings, Inc. v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage 
Services, L.P., 785 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2015), Roberts has 
forfeited his claims by failing to abide by Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 10(b).  We disagree and take this 
opportunity to clarify when forfeiture for failure to 
comply with Rule 10 is appropriate. 
 In Lehman Brothers, appellant Gateway Funding 
argued that the district court had erred by concluding that 
it waived an argument in a telephonic oral argument 
before the court.  Gateway Funding then claimed that no 
record of this proceeding existed, a statement which 
turned out to be false.  We went on to hold that 
Gateway’s argument regarding the allegedly erroneous 
finding of waiver had been forfeited under Rule 10(b).4  
Because that case has been the subject of much 
confusion, it merits some discussion here. 
 We begin by noting that in Lehman Brothers we 
did not cavalierly hold that any failure to comply with 
Rule 10(b) would result in forfeiture.  Instead, we 
                                                 
4 Rule 10(b) states in relevant part that “[i]f the appellant 
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the 
evidence, the appellant must include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding or 
conclusion.”  Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). 
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carefully considered a host of factors, including “whether 
the defaulting party’s action is willful or merely 
inadvertent, whether a lesser sanction can bring about 
compliance and the degree of prejudice the opposing 
party has suffered because of the default.”  Id. at 101.  In 
so doing, we noted first that Gateway specifically argued 
on appeal that no record existed of the district court’s 
telephonic oral argument.  This contention was proven 
wrong.  We thus expressed our concern that Gateway’s 
failure to provide a transcript of the telephonic oral 
argument, a clear violation of Rule 10(b), “at best shows 
a remarkable lack of diligence and at worst indicates an 
intent to deceive this Court.”  Id.  We were also 
unimpressed by Gateway’s “weak post hoc justification” 
for its failure to comply with Rule 10(b).  Id.  We next 
took pains to emphasize throughout that this sanction was 
“not favored,” “unusual,” and “should be sparingly 
used.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted).  Finally, we explained that even if we 
considered Gateway’s argument on the merits, we were 
unlikely to overturn the district court’s ruling both 
because we were reviewing for abuse of discretion and 
because the transcript did not support Gateway’s 
contentions.  Id. at 101 n.2. 
 The takeaway, then, from Lehman Brothers should 
be clear: Gateway made an affirmative and serious 
misstatement in its brief before this Court when it stated 
that no record of the telephonic oral argument existed.  
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This, we concluded, evinced either an intent to deceive 
the Court or a “remarkable lack of diligence.”  Id. at 101.  
Even so, that alone was insufficient to warrant forfeiture, 
because we went on to consider Gateway’s post hoc 
explanation for its failure.  Only upon finding Gateway’s 
explanation lacking did we conclude that forfeiture was 
an appropriate sanction. 
 We are not confronted with such a situation here.  
There is no allegation that Roberts misrepresented the 
existence or non-existence of the trial transcript or that 
the explanation for his omission was a disingenuous post 
hoc rationalization.  Thus, the argument that Roberts 
showed a “remarkable lack of diligence” here, just as 
Gateway did in Lehman Brothers, is misplaced.  Roberts 
was derelict in preparing the record for appeal—he 
certainly should have included the parts of the trial and 
pre-trial transcripts that were a part of the record—but 
this failure is simply not comparable to the serious 
concerns we raised in Lehman Brothers.  We therefore 
conclude that Roberts’ failure to comply with Rule 10(b) 
does not warrant forfeiture of his claims on appeal. 
III. 
 We next address whether it was an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court to dismiss Roberts’ post-
trial motion because it concluded that he failed to 
prosecute his case.  As we have held on multiple 
occasions, dismissal for failure to prosecute “must be a 
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sanction of last, not first, resort.”  Knoll v. City of 
Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013).  That being 
said, we are also well aware that “[t]he power to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute . . . rests in the discretion of the 
trial court and is part of its inherent authority to prevent 
undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to 
avoid congestion in its docket.”  Hewlett v. Davis, 844 
F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1988).  To that end, where a 
plaintiff’s actions amount to the willful refusal to 
prosecute or blatant failure to comply with a district court 
order, dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate.  
See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 
1994); Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 
1990).5   
 Turning to the facts of this case, the District Court 
on September 29, 2014, ordered the parties to recreate a 
trial record according to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 10(c) because the trial transcripts had not and 
                                                 
5 Normally, before a district court may sua sponte 
dismiss a motion for failure to prosecute, it must consider 
the six factors outlined in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), but the 
Poulis factors do not apply to post-trial motions.  Knoll, 
707 F.3d at 409-10 (“[A] district court need not engage in 
a Poulis analysis when it dismisses a post-trial motion for 
noncompliance with procedural rules or court orders.”). 
13 
 
could not be recovered.6  As laid out in Rule 10(c), “[i]f 
the transcript of a hearing or trial is unavailable, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including the 
appellant’s recollection.”  Fed. R. App. P. 10(c).  This 
statement is then to be “served on the appellee, who may 
serve objections or proposed amendments within 14 days 
after being served.”  Id.  Finally, in the event of any 
disagreement, the statement and objections or 
amendments “must then be submitted to the district court 
for settlement and approval.”  Id. 
 Nine months after being ordered to comply with 
Rule 10(c), Roberts had not submitted a proposed 
statement to Defendants.  Indeed, Roberts’ only response 
when he was ordered to explain his failure to comply 
with Rule 10(c) was that “it was agreed by counsel for 
the Parties . . . that neither side would agree [to] the 
other’s recreation of the trial events, so the effort [to 
comply with Rule 10(c)] would be futile.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 
Resp. to Def.’s Notice to Dismiss 4, ECF No. 264.  
Defendants vigorously contest this alleged “agreement.”  
Roberts then goes on to assert that there is “no such court 
rule” that allowed the District Court to order the parties 
                                                 
6 Recreating the record was particularly important here 
because Judge Quiñones had not presided over the trial 
and thus could not otherwise have meaningfully 
considered the merits of Roberts’ post-trial motion.   
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to attempt to recreate the record, and further suggests that 
Judge Quiñones was biased7 against him because “the 
defendants were also ordered to present a recreated 
record and they also did not present a recreated record, 
yet nothing is said of this by the district court.”  
Appellant’s Br. 16 n.1. 
 Roberts’ counsel should take the time to read Rule 
10(c).  He would then discover “such [a] court rule.”  
Indeed, it both provides a specific mechanism by which 
the parties can have their dispute over the contents of the 
trial court record resolved, and clearly places the 
responsibility for initially creating the record on the 
appellant.  As a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
10(c) is typically invoked for creating a record for meaningful 
review on appeal, but district courts have used Rule 10(c) as a 
guide when, as here, the district court itself needs a 
reconstructed record in order to rule on the dispute before it.  
E.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 21 F. 
Supp. 3d 381, 382 n.1 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 606 F. App’x 669 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
 This brings us to the heart of the dispute: whether 
                                                 
7 Given that Roberts ultimately alleged or suggested bias 
on the part of three different and very able Judges in a 
single case, we are wary about giving any credit to these 
allegations.  That said, there is no need to assess these 
claims for the reasons discussed infra. 
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the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing 
Roberts’ post-trial motion for failure to prosecute, which 
was a direct result of his failure to comply with the 
District Court’s directive to file a reconstructed record 
per the process outlined in Rule 10(c).  Roberts’ blatant 
refusal to comply with the District Court’s September 29, 
2014, Order amounts to a willful refusal to move his own 
post-trial motion forward, which, per Spain and Guyer, 
places the District Court’s decision to dismiss for failure 
to prosecute well within its discretion.  We will thus 
affirm the District Court on that basis.8 
                                                 
8 We have also consistently affirmed dismissals for 
failure to prosecute when a plaintiff fails to comply with 
a Local Rule requiring him to supply the district court 
with the relevant record.  See, e.g., Knoll, 707 F.3d at 
410-11; Hewlett, 844 F.2d at 114-15; see also E.D. Pa. 
Local R. Civ. P. 7.1(e) (“Within fourteen (14) days after 
filing any post-trial motion, the movant shall either (a) 
order a transcript of the trial by a writing delivered to the 
Court Reporter Supervisor, or (b) file a verified motion 
showing good cause to be excused from this requirement.  
Unless a transcript is thus ordered, or the movant excused 
from ordering a transcript, the post-trial motion may be 
dismissed for lack of prosecution.”).  Here, two-thirds of 
the transcripts were missing, making these past cases 
hinging on the Local Rule not directly on point, but the 
lesson from those cases remains instructive and 
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IV. 
 Because we conclude the District Court did not err 
in dismissing Roberts’ post-trial motion on account of his 
failing to even attempt to comply with the District 
Court’s directive to provide a recreated trial transcript, 
we need not determine whether a new trial is actually 
warranted.  Even if we were to entertain that question, 
however, Roberts’ failure to recreate the record pursuant 
to Rule 10(c) would also foreclose review of the merits 
of his appeal by our Court.   
 Courts of appeals have consistently held that when 
an appellant chooses not to avail him or herself of the 
procedure available in Rule 10(c) for recreating the trial 
record, he or she cannot then claim on appeal that the 
loss of the trial records, without more, necessitates a new 
trial.  This is so primarily because the appellant is 
responsible for ensuring that the record is sufficiently 
complete on appeal.  Thus, in asking us to grant him a 
new trial, Roberts must have at least attempted to 
recreate the record in compliance with Rule 10(c)—an 
                                                                                                             
buttresses our conclusion that the District Court’s 
insistence on a Rule 10(c) record was appropriate: when 
a plaintiff fails to provide the district court with the 
materials necessary to resolve the case, dismissal for 
failure to prosecute is an appropriate exercise of the 
district court’s discretion. 
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effort he has failed to undertake in the slightest.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Sierra, 981 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 
1992) (“[Appellants] could have sought to reconstruct the 
record in that respect by conference with trial counsel for 
submission to the district court.  In the absence of that 
minimal effort . . . we see no reason to direct a remand 
for the purpose of reconstruction of the unrecorded 
portions of the record.”); United States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 
1229, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Furthermore, even if Mr. 
Kelly were able to articulate an adequate claim of 
prejudice from the purported omissions in the record, that 
claim would be significantly undermined (if not defeated) 
by Mr. Kelly’s failure to avail himself of established 
procedures—specifically, the procedures of Fed. R. App. 
P. 10(c)—for reconstructing the gaps in the record.”); 
Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814, 821 (6th Cir. 
1994) (“[P]laintiffs cannot justify their failure to invoke 
Rule 10(c) merely by asserting that to do so would have 
led to disputes with opposing counsel.”); United States v. 
Nolan, 910 F.2d 1553, 1560 (7th Cir. 1990) (“We 
recognize that sometimes trial participants’ recollections 
may be too vague, and notes and other trial materials too 
sketchy, to make Rule 10(c) an adequate device for 
reconstructing a record.  . . .  Still, given Rule 10(c), we 
agree with the Sixth Circuit that it is not appropriate to 
reverse a district court for failing to [record the court 
proceedings,] ‘[a]bsent a showing by counsel on appeal 
of a reasonable but unsuccessful effort to determine the 
substance of the off-the-record remarks.’” (internal 
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citation omitted)); Herndon v. City of Massillon, 638 
F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1981) (“The clear lesson of these 
cases is that a party may not seek a new trial simply 
because matters occurring in the district court are not 
reflected in the transcript.  Rather, that party must at least 
attempt to cure the defect by reconstructing the record as 
provided by Fed. R. App. Pro. 10(c).”); Murphy v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30, 31-32 (5th 
Cir. 1963) (“The appellants have not availed themselves 
of the provisions of [an analogue to Rule 10(c)], a 
procedure which might well have enabled them to bring a 
sufficient record before us.  In the absence of compliance 
with the Rules, the charges urged to be erroneous are not 
in the record and not before us.”).  We therefore hold that 
it was not an abuse of discretion for Judge Quiñones to 
deny Roberts’ post-trial motion.  By refusing to even 
attempt to comply with Judge Quiñones order, Roberts 
essentially prevented any meaningful review of his 
claims. 
 This, however, is not to say that when a party’s 
attempted compliance with Rule 10(c) yields an 
insufficient record, post-trial or appellate review is 
limited to that insufficient record.  As we have noted 
before, a recreated trial record “can be satisfactory” 
because “‘often, the reconstructed record will enable the 
appellate court effectively to review the relevant issues.’”  
United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Sierra, 981 F.2d at 126).  But in Sussman, 
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we specifically left the door open for an appellant to 
argue that the recreated record was insufficient to provide 
meaningful review.  We explained that, after recreating 
the record according to Rule 10(c), in order “[t]o qualify 
for a new trial, . . . Sussman must make ‘a specific 
showing of prejudice’ from the absence of the 
transcripts.”  Id. at 170 (quoting Sierra, 981 F.2d at 125 
(“[T]he mere absence of the sidebar transcripts does not 
signify prejudice.”)); see also United States v. Renton, 
700 F.2d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A]ppellant must 
show that failure to record and preserve the specific 
portion of the trial proceedings visits a hardship upon 
him and prejudices his appeal.”).  Without any recreated 
trial record, however, we cannot even begin to assess 
whether the requisite prejudice existed here to warrant 
granting Roberts a new trial. 
 We are thus satisfied that our holding in this case 
leaves open avenues for appellants to seek appropriate 
relief if they can show that they were prejudiced by the 
loss of part or all of the record below.  Such an appellant 
must comply with the dictates of Rule 10(c) and then 
present specific reasons why his or her attempt to re-
create the record was insufficient.  This would allow us 
on appeal (or the district court when considering a post-
trial motion) to properly assess whether we could in fact 
grant meaningful review of the appellant’s claims 
without the actual trial transcript available to us.  See, 
e.g., Bergerco, U.S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 
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896 F.2d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that despite 
compliance with Rule 10(c), because “we cannot 
meaningfully review the district court’s findings [without 
the benefit of the missing trial transcripts,] . . . [t]his is 
one of the rare cases where a retrial is appropriate”).  
Roberts has failed to provide us with the tools to make 
such an assessment and thus cannot prevail in his quest to 
overturn the District Court’s dismissal of his post-trial 
motion and obtain a new trial. 
V. 
 We next turn to the second issue Roberts raises on 
appeal: whether Judge Savage erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on counts II and III.9  
Roberts raises two claims of error, neither of which has 
merit.  First, Roberts claims that it was error for Judge 
Savage to “reconsider” both counts because the 
                                                 
9 Because the District Court’s denial of Roberts’ post-
trial motion was a final decision within the meaning of  
28 U.S.C. § 1291, “[u]nder the ‘merger rule,’ prior 
interlocutory orders . . . merge with the final judgment in 
a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that 
they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on 
appeal from the final order.”  Camesi, 729 F.3d at 244-45 
(quoting In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 
(3d Cir. 1996)). 
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magistrate judge had already entertained a summary 
judgment motion and denied summary judgment on the 
same counts.  This argument fails for multiple reasons, 
not the least of which is that Roberts sought to revoke his 
consent to have the case heard by the magistrate judge on 
October 6, 2011, and his request was granted on January 
4, 2012.  Thus, allegations that Judge Savage overstepped 
his authority are baseless. 
 In addition, the bald claim that once a motion for 
summary judgment has been ruled on, the District Court 
loses the “statutory authority” to later grant summary 
judgment is simply erroneous.  Appellant’s Br. 27.  As 
we have consistently held, when “(1) new evidence is 
available; (2) a supervening new law has been 
announced; or (3) the earlier decision was clearly 
erroneous and would create manifest injustice,” the law 
of the case doctrine does not apply and the court is free to 
reconsider an earlier denial of summary judgment.  Pub. 
Interest Research Grp. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium 
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997).  We 
also have held that “the law of the case doctrine does not 
limit the power of trial judges to reconsider their prior 
decisions,” but have noted that when a court does so, it 
must explain on the record why it is doing so and “take 
appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by 
reliance on the prior ruling.”  Williams v. Runyon, 130 
F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Krueger Assocs., 
Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 
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2001) (“Under the law of the case doctrine the district 
court’s denial of ADT’s initial summary judgment 
motion did not create any bar to the court’s later 
reconsideration of the renewed motion.”); Preaseau v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 591 F.2d 74, 79-80 (9th Cir. 
1979) (“This practice reflects the rule that an order 
denying a motion for summary judgment is generally 
interlocutory and subject to reconsideration by the court 
at any time.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 In this case, we conclude that Judge Savage did not 
err in reconsidering the magistrate judge’s prior denial of 
summary judgment.  Not only were the magistrate 
judge’s prior rulings in this case likely void,10 but the 
record also makes it clear that in both instances Judge 
Savage was presented with changed circumstances that 
the magistrate judge was unaware of at the time he ruled 
on Roberts’ claims.  Regarding both counts, the 
                                                 
10 See United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 330 
(5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that lack of consent to 
disposition by a magistrate judge would strip the 
magistrate judge of jurisdiction over the case); 32 Am. 
Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 140 (“Once the magistrate judge 
allows the withdrawal of consent, it is as if the consent 
had never been given, and, accordingly, the magistrate 
judge lacks the power to try the case and enter a 
judgment in it.”). 
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magistrate judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 
564 U.S. 379 (2011), since it was decided within days of 
the denial of summary judgment.  This case, Judge 
Savage concluded, “absolutely . . . control[led]” both of 
Roberts’ First Amendment retaliation claims.  Tr. of Trial 
– Day 1 at 17, Roberts v. Ferman, No. 09-4895 (February 
29, 2012).  Thus, reconsideration was not procedurally 
erroneous.  In addition, an intervening decision from the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court cast further doubt on the 
viability of count III,  specifically calling into doubt 
Roberts’ ability to hold the County liable for the actions 
of certain Defendants since their employment status was 
now unclear.  For this reason, Judge Savage ordered the 
parties to submit supplemental briefing on the effect of 
this case.  As Roberts’ attorney noted, “[i]f the law is 
changed, that would be a reason for reconsideration.”  Tr. 
of Final Pretrial Conference at 236, Roberts v. Ferman, 
No. 09-4895 (February 21, 2012).  Accordingly, Judge 
Savage’s reconsideration of summary judgment on both 
counts was procedurally proper.  Roberts’ procedural 
objection that Judge Savage simply could not reconsider 
the magistrate judge’s partial denial of summary 
judgment is, therefore, without merit. 
 Finally, we also reject Roberts’ claim that Judge 
Savage could not “sua sponte” grant summary judgment 
since there was no motion filed by Defendants.  As we 
have held, “authority has developed to allow a court to 
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grant summary judgment to a non-moving party” so long 
as the court gives “notice that [it] is considering a sua 
sponte summary judgment motion” and “provide[s] the 
party with an opportunity to present relevant evidence in 
opposition to that motion.”  Chambers Dev. Co. v. 
Passaic Cty. Utils. Auth., 62 F.3d 582, 584 n.5 (3d Cir. 
1995); see also DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 
506 F.3d 209, 223 (3d Cir. 2007)  (“District courts may 
grant summary judgment sua sponte in appropriate 
circumstances.”).  Here, both of the above requirements 
were met prior to the grant of summary judgment. 
VI. 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm 
Judge Quiñones’ order denying Roberts’ post-trial 
motion. 
 
 
